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ABSTRACT
The appeals process -- whereby litigants can have decisions of adjudicators reviewed by a higher
authority -- is a general feature of formal legal systems (and of many private decisionmaking
procedures). It leads to the making of better decisions, because it constitutes a threat to adjudicators
whose decisions would deviate too much from socially desirable ones. Further, it yields this benefit
without absorbing resources to the extent that adjudicators can anticipate when appeals would occur


















  This article develops the point that the ability of litigants to appeal decisions of  
adjudicators to a higher authority may lead to the making of better decisions because the 
appeals process constitutes a threat to adjudicators whose decisions would deviate too 
much from socially desirable ones.  The appeals process is a feature of virtually all 
formal legal systems, of many private dispute resolution arrangements (such as those of 
trade associations and religious organizations), and also of certain decisionmaking 
procedures within firms, so its relevance is broad.
1  Indeed, whenever a person might be 
affected by a deviant action of an agent and would be led to report it credibly to the 
principal, one might consider an appeals process of a sort to be at work.  The appeals 
process can thus be conceived as a general way to mold the behavior of an agent to a 
principal’s benefit.
2
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1 On the appeals process in formal legal systems worldwide, see generally Herzog and Karlen 
(1982) and Platto (1992); on the appeals process in administrative agencies and in private organizations, 
see, for example, Mertens (1994), sections 49B.45-53, Scott (1965), chapter 3, and Weiler and Roberts 
(1993), p. 667.  
 
2 Nevertheless, I generally refer to the context of legal adjudication in this article; but see the 
concluding remarks on the broader view.  
1   In section 2, I study a basic model in which there is a socially correct decision, an 
adjudicator may obtain a benefit from choosing a different decision, and each of two 
opposing litigants has the right to appeal a decision to an appeals court, at a cost.  
Because the adjudicator can anticipate that a decision would be appealed if its deviation 
is large enough to outweigh the cost of an appeal to a litigant, the adjudicator will be led 
to keep his deviations below the point at which appeals would be provoked.  Thus, the 
appeals process induces decisions to conform to socially desirable decisions, at least 
within the range governed by the cost of an appeal.  Furthermore, the appeals process 
yields this benefit without absorbing resources, as the appeals process does not actually 
result in appeals (although, as will be discussed, appeals do occur in an extension of the 
basic model where adjudicators are uncertain whether appeals will be made
3).
   Hence, 
when the appeals process results in changes in adjudicator behavior, it raises social 
welfare. 
To better appreciate the virtue of the appeals process, it is compared in section 3 
to a natural alternative, namely, random monitoring of adjudicators’ decisions.  Random 
monitoring of decisions can also induce adjudicators to conform their decisions to 
socially desirable decisions.  But for monitoring to be effective, a positive degree of 
monitoring must actually occur.  Thus, unlike the appeals process, random monitoring 
absorbs resources.  The cost advantage of the appeals process over random monitoring 
(which may well exist even when the appeals process does result in appeals, due to 
uncertainty) reflects what may be regarded as a distinctive feature of the appeals process: 
                                                 
3 Another reason that the appeals process may absorb resources is that society may need to invest 
some amount in appeals courts in order that the threat of appeal be credible to adjudicators.  
2 that it harnesses the information that litigants possess about decisions and thus leads to 
review of decisions only if they deviate from socially desirable decisions.   
In section 4, a series of extensions of the basic model is considered.  The first 
concerns subsidy of the appeals process.  Here it is explained that a subsidy is beneficial 
(and that the optimal subsidy is complete) since, on one hand, it increases the threat of 
appeal and thus makes adjudicator decisions better reflect socially desirable ones, and, on 
the other hand, a subsidy does not lead to greater social costs since appeals do not 
actually occur. 
The second extension relates to contexts in which only a single litigant can make 
an appeal (such as individuals contesting benefit awards by the Social Security 
Administration).  Here the effectiveness of the appeals process is reduced relative to what 
it is when there are opposing litigants, since any decision that is favorable to the single 
litigant will not be appealed; the appeals process functions only to discipline unfavorable 
decisions to the litigant. 
The third extension addresses the possibility that a litigant who would want to 
make an appeal could instead settle with the opposing litigant, in order to save the joint 
costs of an appeal.  Although a litigant who could bring an appeal would have a motive to 
settle, the adjudicator would still want to avoid decisions that would provoke appeal, for 
the adjudicator would not want the accompanying settlement to occur.  Therefore, the 
adjudicator’s decision turns out to be the same as when settlement of appeals is not 
considered as a possibility. 
The fourth extension allows for multiple levels of appeal.  It is shown that 
decisions at each level are implicitly guided by the preferences of all higher levels, 
3 including the topmost, say the n
th, level of appeal, because decisions at the n – 1
st level of 
appeal will reflect judicial preferences at the n
th level, decisions at the n – 2
nd level of 
appeal will reflect decisions that would be made at the n – 1
st level, and so on.   In this 
way, judicial preferences at the highest level of appeal are translated all the way down to 
the adjudicator at the trial court level.  However, the transmission of judicial preferences 
is not perfect; in particular, trial court decisions may differ from those preferred by the 
highest appeals court by as much as the sum of the costs of appeal across the different 
levels of appeal.   
The fifth extension concerns uncertainty about the outcome of an appeal.  When 
parties are uncertain what the socially desirable decision that would be found by the 
appeals court would be, the appeals process leads adjudicators to conform their decisions 
to the expected appeals court decision rather than to the actual, socially preferred 
decision.  This renders the appeals process less valuable than when appeals court 
decisions are accurately foreseen and may make the appeals process socially undesirable.  
A corollary to this point, with a very different interpretation, is also noted.  Suppose that 
uncertain appeals courts decisions are not presumed to be socially desirable (whereas 
they are assumed so immediately above) but that they are socially desirable on average.  
Then adjudicators who are uncertain about appeals court decisions will make decisions as 
if appeals courts always make the social desirable decision. 
The sixth extension involves uncertainty about whether an appeal will be made.  
When adjudicators are uncertain whether litigants will make an appeal, adjudicator 
decisions will sometimes not forestall appeals, and appeals will in fact occur.  This 
4 means, among other things, that the appeals process becomes socially costly, and may not 
be socially worthwhile. 
The last extension examines the possibility of granting discretion to appeals 
courts to decide whether or not to hear cases that have been appealed.  Giving appeals 
courts such discretion offers a potential social cost-saving advantage: a litigant may wish 
to make an appeal even though the social cost of an appeal outweighs the social benefit, 
so that refusal by the appeals court to consider an appeal may be socially beneficial.  Yet 
discretion is not necessarily socially desirable, because it reduces the threat of appeal to 
the adjudicator, and hence his motive to make his decisions resemble those of the appeals 
court. 
  The point of this article, that the appeals process influences the decisions of 
adjudicators because they want to avoid appeal, is a common theme in a general 
qualitative sense in legal literature,
4 but has not been much developed to my knowledge 
in economically-oriented literature.  However, particular aspects of the effect of the 
appeals process on adjudicator behavior have been examined by economists: Levy (2003) 
focuses on the tendency of judges to provoke appeal, so as to signal that they are talented 
and to benefit from an enhanced reputation; and Iossa and Palumbo (2004) emphasize the 
role of the appeals process in a comparison of the adversarial and inquisitorial methods of 
acquisition of evidence.  Also, a number of articles on appeals investigate factors other 
than control of adjudicator behavior.  Shavell (1995) and Cameron and Kornhauser 
(2004) study how the appeals process functions to correct lower court errors (as opposed 
to preventing them, the subject of this article); Spitzer and Talley (2000), and Daughety 
                                                 
4 See for example, Dalton (1985) and Pound (1941), p. 3. 
  
5 and Reinganum (2004) analyze the exercise of discretion by appeals courts over whether 
to review lower court decisions; and Daughety and Reinganum (2000) stress inference by 
appeals courts about superior courts from the fact that appeals are brought.   
6  
2. Basic Model 




appeal -- at a cost
If appeal is made,
appeals court makes 
ultimate decision
time 1 time 2 time 3
 
 
As the timeline indicates, an adjudicator makes an initial decision.  This decision – or, 
rather, whatever is the ultimate decision – affects the adjudicator’s utility (he might have 
his own idea of what constitutes a proper decision, or have private interests in the 
decision
5).  The decision also affects social welfare and litigants’ utilities.  Let 
                                                 
5 An adjudicator might have a personal view of social welfare and care about it.  Also, an 
adjudicator might have a private interest in a decision because he is bribed or threatened.  In the context of 
decisionmaking within a firm, say that of a supervisor (an adjudicator) about the promotion of an employee 
(a litigant, who could appeal a negative decision to another person in the firm), the supervisor’s utility 
would not necessarily align with the firm’s; his utility from the promotion decision would tend to depend 
on how the employee’s performance would relate to the promotion decision and in turn on how the 
employee’s performance would affect the supervisor’s remuneration.  
 
7     d  =  adjudicator’s decision; d is a real number;
6
u(d)  = utility of the adjudicator; 
w(d) = social welfare; 
    d = utility of litigant 1; 
  –d = utility of litigant 2. 
The functions u and w are assumed to be differentiable and strictly concave.
7  Note that 
the litigants have opposing interests in the decision d.
8   
Let d* be the adjudicator’s preferred decision and dS* be the socially optimal 
decision, and assume that d* is unequal to dS* (this is the case of interest). 
As the timeline also indicates, a litigant is presumed to be able to make an appeal 
to an appeals court at a cost; an appeal is assumed to involve a cost to defend on the part 
of the opposing litigant as well.   
If an appeal is made, the appeals court is assumed to set the adjudicator’s decision 
equal to the socially optimal one dS* if the decision deviated from dS*.  In other words, 
the appeals court is implicitly assumed to have social welfare w(d) as its utility function,
9 
                                                 
6 The decision d might be interpreted as the amount that one litigant is required to pay the other 
(possibly zero if no liability is found). 
 
7 The assumption of strict concavity guarantees that there is a unique optimal decision and that the 
closer a decision is to the optimal one, the better.  The importance of the assumption is noted at the end of 
this section.  
 
8 The results to be obtained would be qualitatively similar if instead it were assumed that litigant 1 
has a utility function v1(d) that is monotonically increasing in d and that litigant 2 has a utility function 
v2(d) that is monotonically decreasing in d.   
 
9 The case in which the appeals court has a different utility function from society’s is discussed at 
the end of this section, in sections 4.4 and 4.5, and in the first concluding remark. 
  
8 so that, when presented with an appeal, it maximizes w(d).
10  It is also assumed that if the 
adjudicator’s decision differed from dS* a reversal penalty is imposed on the adjudicator.   
Define 
c = cost to a litigant of making or of opposing an appeal; c > 0;
11
r = reversal penalty imposed on the adjudicator if d is unequal to dS*; r $ 0.
12
If an appeal is made and d is unequal to dS*, the adjudicator’s utility will thus be u(dS*) – 
r; his utility overall is assumed to be separable in r.   Additionally, if an appeal is made, 
social welfare will be w(dS*) – 2c; social welfare is assumed to be separable in litigation 
costs.   
Adjudicators are assumed to know c, r, and dS*.  Litigants are assumed to know c 
and dS*. 
Under these assumptions, an appeal of a decision d will be made by litigant 1 
when dS* – c  > d, since the left side is what the litigant would obtain if there were an 
appeal and the right side is what he would obtain otherwise.
13  Likewise, an appeal will 
be made by litigant 2 when d  >  dS* + c.
14  Thus the set of decisions for which appeals 
would not be made is d in 
                                                 
10 This presumes that the appeals court cannot commit to a different decision from dS*; see the end 
of this section on why the appeals court would want to commit to a different decision.   
  
11 The assumption that the cost of making the appeal and of opposing the appeal are the same is 
inessential. 
  
12 In reality, r may be to an extent exogenous, because it may include a reputational loss to an 
adjudicator, and r might also in principle depend on the difference between d and dS*.  In any case, the 
magnitude of r does not matter in the basic model or in most of the extensions, as it will turn out that 
appeals not occur.  The magnitude of r does matter in section 4.6, however, because appeals do occur there.  
 
13 I am assuming that if the litigant is indifferent, he will not bring an appeal, and make similar 
assumptions below without comment. 
 
14 I am implicitly assuming that, if one of the parties would wish to make an appeal, there is no 
settlement with the opposing party.  Settlement is discussed in section 4.3. 
9 (1)   N = [dS* – c, dS* + c]. 
Note that the adjudicator knows N as he knows c and dS*. 
  Let us describe the decision d** that the adjudicator actually makes.  The 
adjudicator will select a decision in N.  If he does not do so, there will be an appeal and 
he will obtain utility of u(dS*) – r, whereas he could always guarantee that he is at least as 
well off by choosing dS*, an element of N, in which case he would obtain u(dS*).  Indeed, 
the adjudicator must be strictly better off by choosing a decision in N: if r > 0, he is 
strictly better off merely choosing dS*; and even if r = 0, he must still be strictly better 
off, since either a slightly higher or slightly lower d than dS* must increase his utility (for 
u must be strictly monotonic in d at dS* since dS* does not maximize u and u is strictly 
concave), which can be chosen so as to be in N.  We thus know that the adjudicator will 
select d to maximize his utility in N.  In particular, if d* is in N, he will obviously choose 
d*.  If d* is to the left of N, he will choose its left end point dS* – c (since u is strictly 
concave).  Similarly, if d* is to the right of N, he will choose dS* + c. 
  We may summarize as follows. 
Proposition 1.  (a) The adjudicator’s decision d** is the personally best decision 
in the set N = [dS* – c, dS* + c] that forestalls appeals, so that appeals never in fact occur.   
(b) If the unconstrained best choice d* of the adjudicator would not result in an 
appeal, the adjudicator’s choice d** is d*.  Otherwise, the adjudicator chooses the  
closest end point of N  (d** is either dS* – c or dS* + c), a decision that barely forestalls 
appeals.   
(c) The adjudicator’s decision d** differs from the socially optimal decision dS*.// 
                                                                                                                                                 
  
10 It should be noted that, the smaller the set N, the closer will be the induced 
decision d** of the adjudicator to dS*; hence, the lower is the cost c of an appeal, the 
closer must be the adjudicator’s decision to dS*.   Also, as explained in the proof, the 
penalty r for reversal plays no role in adjudicator behavior; regardless of the magnitude 
of r (even if it is zero), the adjudicator will choose a decision in N, so that r is irrelevant 
for him. 
The next proposition states that the appeals process can only enhance social 
welfare. 
Proposition 2.  If the appeals process leads the adjudicator to alter his decision 
(that is, if d** is unequal to d*, because d* lies outside N), social welfare rises.// 
This result follows because, from Proposition 1(b), we know that when d* < dS* – 
c, the adjudicator chooses dS* – c.  Since w is strictly concave, social welfare must be 
increasing in d to the left of dS* and hence social welfare must be higher at dS* – c than at 
d*.  Similarly, since when d* > dS* + c, the adjudicator chooses dS* + c, social welfare 
must be higher at dS* + c.  Moreover, since no appeals are actually made, social welfare 
does not fall from c actually being incurred by each litigant.   
Before continuing, several comments about this section are worth making.  First, 
it was assumed that the appeals court maximizes social welfare w(d) in any case that 
comes before it, so chooses dS*.   If, though, the appeals court could commit to a 
decision, the appeals court would generally choose a different decision because it could 
then induce the adjudicator to choose dS* (rather than a different decision, either d*, dS* – 
c, or dS* + c ).   Specifically, if the adjudicator’s preferred decision d* is less than dS*, let 
the appeals court commit to dS* + c.  Then N = [dS* + c  – c, dS* + c  + c] = [dS*, dS* + 
11 2c], and by the logic of Proposition 1, the adjudicator would select dS*.  Likewise, if d* > 
dS*, then provided that the appeals court commits to  dS* – c, N = [dS* – 2c, dS* ] and the 
adjudicator would again select dS*.  The assumption that the appeals court cannot commit 
to a decision different from dS* might fit if, as seems to be true, appeals courts must 
adhere to legal principles; for to commit to a different decision from dS* might openly 
contravene the legal principles they are supposed to follow. 
Second, it was assumed that the appeals court’s utility function is the social one, 
w(d).  If its utility function is different, say h(d), then of course all that was said above 
would just be reinterpreted to apply to h(d); that is, dS* would be replaced by dh*, where 
dh* is the decision that maximizes h(d), and so forth.  See also sections 4.4 and 4.5 and 
the concluding remarks on the situation where the appeals court’s utility function is not 
society’s. 
Third, suppose that one considers a general version of the basic model, in which 
the set of possible decisions of the adjudicator could be of an arbitrary nature and no 
restrictions would be placed on u and w and the litigant’s utilities from decisions.  In such 
a general model, Proposition 1(a) would continue to hold: the argument that the 
adjudicator chooses a decision that forestalls appeal, and thus that appeals do not occur, 
would still apply, as it depends only on the assumption that the adjudicator can predict 
when appeals would be made.  Proposition 1(b) would not hold, however, because the 
adjudicator might not select a decision on the boundary of N (and N might not have a 
boundary); and Proposition 1(c) would not hold, because the adjudicator might choose 
12 dS*.
15  Also, Proposition 2 would not hold, because the change in the adjudicator’s 
decision might turn out to lower social welfare.
16  
3. Appeals Process versus Random Monitoring 
   To gain understanding about the appeals process, it is useful to compare it to 
random monitoring of adjudicators’ decisions, under which a sanction would be imposed 
on the adjudicator if his decision deviated from the socially optimal decision.  Suppose 
that   
p = probability that the adjudicator’s decision d is monitored; 
k = sanction if d deviates from the socially optimal decision dS*;
17 k > 0; 
m = social cost of monitoring; m > 0.  
The amount m must be expended in order for the decision of the adjudicator to be 
observed by the social authority.  Hence, the expected cost of monitoring is pm. 
If the adjudicator decides not to choose dS* he will choose d*.  Hence, he will be 
led to choose dS* if 
(2)    u(dS*) $ u(d*) – pk. 
If pk is not large enough to satisfy (2), so that monitoring has no effect on adjudicator 
behavior, then monitoring is inferior to the appeals process.  In particular, under 
monitoring, social welfare is w(d*) – pm, whereas under the appeals process social 
                                                 
15 For example, suppose that the assumptions are as in the model but that u is not concave.  Then u 
could have a local maximum in the interior of N, and this local maximum could be at dS*.    
 
16 For example, suppose that the assumptions are as in the model but that w is not concave.  
Suppose also that d* < dS* –  c and that w has a local maximum at d*, where w(d*) is such that w(dS*) – 
w(d*) = , for a small ,.  The appeals process would result in the adjudicator choosing dS* –  c, but w(dS* – 
c) <  w(d*) if , is sufficiently small, so the appeals process would lower social welfare. 
 
17 The variables p and k are taken as fixed, although they would be optimally chosen in a more 
general model, along the lines in Becker (1968).  In such a model, the sanction k would be maximal 
(assuming that adjudicators are risk neutral) and p would be lower than if k were not maximal, but the 
qualitative nature of the conclusions to be discussed below would be unaffected.   
13 welfare is at least w(d*); monitoring is worse since it absorbs resources, whereas the 
appeals process is costless as appeals are never made.   
If pk is large enough so that (2) is satisfied, then monitoring may or may not be 
superior to the appeals process.  Under monitoring, social welfare is w(dS*) – pm.  Under 
the appeals process, social welfare is w(d**) (which is either w(d*), w(dS* – c), or w(dS* 
+ c), which is less than w(dS*).  Hence, the appeals process is superior to monitoring if 
w(d**) > w(dS*) – pm, or if 
(3)       w(dS*) – w(d**) < pm, 
that is, if the loss due to the deviation from optimal decisions under the appeals process is 
less than the expected monitoring expense.   
The following proposition states the conclusions that we have reached about 
monitoring.  
  Proposition 3.  Monitoring of adjudicators’ decisions results in socially desirable 
decisions if the probability of monitoring is sufficiently high.  When monitoring does 
induce socially desirable decisions, it may or may not be superior to the appeals process 
(which does not induce socially optimal decisions).// 
  It should be remarked that the cost advantage of the appeals process over 
monitoring, namely, that under monitoring a positive expected cost must be incurred, 
derives from the fact that, as stated in the introduction, the appeals process uses the 
information that the litigants naturally possess about decisions.  This means that, under 
the appeals process, there can be a threat of review that is conditioned on whether the 
decision deviates from the socially desirable one.  Under monitoring, in contrast, the 
threat of review cannot be conditioned on the decision since the decision is not observed; 
14 hence, to affect adjudicator behavior monitoring must occur regardless of adjudicators’ 
decisions.  In effect, the appeals process involves monitoring from below by an informed 
party, rather than monitoring from above by an uninformed party. 
4. Extensions of the Basic Model 
  Let us now consider (separately) a number of extensions of the basic model of the 
appeals process. 
4.1 Subsidy of appeals.  Suppose that appeals are subsidized by an amount s, 
where s # c,  so that the private cost to a litigant of an appeal is c – s.  Proposition 1 then 
applies, with c – s playing the role of c.  Hence, the set of decisions that do not result in 
appeals becomes  
(4)   N  =  [dS* – (c – s), dS* + (c – s)]. 
If the appeals process without subsidy results in a change in the adjudicator’s decision, 
then the greater the subsidy of the appeals process, the greater the change in the 
adjudicator’s decision and the greater the increase in social welfare.  This is so since, by 
Proposition 1(b), if d* < dS* – c, then d* < dS* – (c – s), and by Proposition 1(b), the 
adjudicator will choose dS* – (c – s), which must further increase social welfare since w 
is strictly concave.  Likewise, if d* > dS* + c, the adjudicator will choose dS* + (c – s), 
which will further increase social welfare.  Note too that, since appeals are not actually 
made, there is no cost associated with c being incurred by litigants.  Hence, social welfare 
increases as s increases.  When s = c, the subsidy is complete, N = {dS*}, and the socially 
optimal outcome dS* results.   In summary, we have 
Proposition 4.  If the appeals process alters the adjudicator’s decision, then 
subsidizing appeals raises social welfare even more, and the greater the subsidy, the 
15 greater the increase in social welfare.  If the subsidy is complete, the socially optimal 
outcome dS* results.// 
Observe as well that if the subsidy is sufficiently high, the appeals process must 
be superior to random monitoring of decisions; for (3) will be satisfied if s is close 
enough to c.   
  4.2 Only a single litigant can make an appeal.  Although the case of two 
litigants who can each make an appeal is typical in litigation, contexts exist in which only 
one party can make an appeal.  For example, only the accused, not the prosecution, can 
ordinarily make an appeal in a criminal matter.
18  Also, there are venues, such as in 
benefits proceedings of the Social Security Administration or in a promotion decision 
within a firm, where there is often effectively only a single litigant (the person who 
would receive benefits or obtain a promotion), so this is the only party who can make an 
appeal. 
If there is just one litigant, with, say, utility of d (the other case is clearly 
essentially identical), the no appeal set is N =  [dS* – c, 4).  The set N is larger than in the 
basic model, since there is no opposing litigant who would appeal decisions in (dS* + c, 
4).  This renders the appeals process less valuable as a method of controlling 
adjudicators’ decisions.  In other words, we have 
Proposition 5.   Where there is only one litigant who can make an appeal, the 
appeals process fails to alter adjudicator decisions if they would favor that litigant.  Thus, 
the appeals process may have lower social value than where there are two opposing 
litigants.// 
                                                 
18 On the inability of the prosecution to make an appeal in a criminal proceeding (except in respect 
to certain issues regarding sentencing), see Stith (1990).    
16 4.3 Settlement of appeals.  It was assumed in the basic model that a litigant 
would make an appeal if doing so would be worth his while.  However, whenever a 
litigant would wish to make an appeal, it would be mutually beneficial for him and the 
opposing litigant to settle, in order to save the litigation costs associated with an appeal.    
To elaborate, suppose that both of the litigants know each other’s litigation costs, 
so know whether either would have a credible threat to make an appeal.  Given this 
assumption of symmetric information, it will be presumed that the litigants would make a 
settlement agreement if and only if there would otherwise be an appeal, where the 
agreement would divide in some way the surplus of 2c of litigation costs from the 
settlement.
19  Since an appeal would result in a decision dS* and yield litigant 1 dS* – c  
and cost litigant 2 dS* + c, the settlement s would be for an amount in the interval [dS* – 
c, dS* + c], which is to say, s would be in N.  But we know from Proposition 1 that the 
adjudicator would be at least as well off choosing his most preferred element of N than to 
have the litigants effectively choose an element of N through settlement.  Hence, the 
adjudicator would select the d in N as described in Proposition 1.  Our conclusion, 
therefore, is 
Proposition 6.  If litigants are able to settle appeals, adjudicators will be led to 
behave exactly as described in Proposition 1.  In particular, adjudicators will choose 
decisions that forestall appeals – and thus that forestall settlements as well.// 
A comment should also be made about the possibility of settlement of the case 
before it is ever adjudicated (as distinct from after it is adjudicated, in lieu of an appeal).   
Since such a settlement would reflect the adjudicator’s decision, and since this would be 
                                                 
19 Of course, if it were assumed that the first litigant makes a single offer to the second, the first 
litigant would capture the entire surplus; there is no reason to be explicit about the nature of bargaining for 
present purposes. 
17 d**, the effect of the threat of appeal on adjudicator behavior would influence settlements 
in the first place.    
4.4 Multiple levels of appeal.   Suppose here that there are n levels of appeal, 
instead of just the single level of appeal in the basic model.  Then the adjudicator’s 
decision will be implicitly influenced by all the levels of appeal, and will be centered on 
the preferences of the top-most appeals court, as indicated in the introduction. 
Let ui(d) be the utility function of the i
th court level and di* be the preferred 
unconstrained choice of the court at level i, where i = 0 is the trial court level, i = 1 is the 
first level of appeal, and i = n is the highest level of appeal.  Assume as well that un(d) = 
w(d), that is, the highest level appeals court has society’s preferences.   Suppose that ci is 
the cost to each litigant of making or defending an appeal at stage i, where i = 1, ..., n.  
Further, suppose that litigants know the utility functions ui(d) of the courts at all levels of 
appeal and that the appeals courts know these as well as the ci.  Thus, the assumptions are 
generalizations of those made in the basic model with one level of appeal. 
To determine adjudicator behavior is straightforward.  If the n
th level appeals 
court were to decide a case, it would choose dS*, as there is no court above it.  
Consequently, the n – 1
st level court would be in a position that is analogous to that of the 
adjudicator in the basic model: this court would choose the decision that maximizes its 
utility un – 1(d) in the set that forestalls appeals at level n, namely, N(n) = [dS* – cn, dS* + 
cn].   Let the decision of n – 1
st appeals court be designated dn – 1**.   By the logic of 
Proposition 1, dn – 1** = dS* – cn  if dn – 1* < dS* – cn; dn – 1** = dn – 1* if dn – 1* is in N(n); 
and dn – 1** = dS* + cn  if dn – 1* > dS* + cn.  By induction, if the n – j
th level court hears a 
case, it would choose the decision that maximizes un – j(d) in N(n – j + 1) = [dn – j + 1** – 
18 cn – j + 1, dn – j + 1** + cn – j + 1], for the n – j
th level court would know that, were it not to 
forestall appeals, the n – j +1
st level decision dn – j + 1** would be the final decision (since 
that court would choose a decision that would forestall appeals).  Consequently, 
                       dn – j + 1** – cn – j + 1   if  dn – j* <  dn – j + 1** – cn – j + 1    
(5)          dn – j**  =     dn – j*   if dn – j*  is in N(n – j + 1) 
               dn – j + 1** + cn – j + 1   if  dn – j* > dn – j + 1** + cn – j + 1. 
It follows from (5) that the initial adjudicator’s decision d0** is in N(1) = [d1** – c1, d1** 
+ c1], where d0**  =  d1** – c1 if d0* < d1** – c, d0**  =  d0*  if d0* is in N(1), d0**  = 
d1** + c1 if d0* > d1** + c1, and that his decision d0**  will forestall appeals. 
Additionally, we claim that 
(6)     N(n – j) d  [dS* – (cn – j + ... + cn), dS* + (cn – j + ... + cn)], 
where the inclusion is generally strict.  In particular, (6) implies that  
(7)     N(1) d [dS* – (c1 + ... + cn), dS* + (c1 + ... + cn)].   
To prove (6), observe that (6) holds for j = 0, since N(n) = [dS* – cn, dS* + cn].  Then the 
formula follows by induction: for any m, N(m) = [dm**  – cm, dm** + cm]; by (5), dm** is 
in N(m + 1); by the inductive hypothesis, N(m + 1) d [dS* – (cm + 1 + ... + cn), dS* + (cm + 
1 + ... + cn)]; hence, N(m) d [dS* – (cm + ... + cn), dS* + (cm + ... + cn)]. 
  We have now established 
  Proposition 7.  Suppose that there are n levels of appeal, where the highest level 
court has society’s preferences.   
(a) The initial adjudicator’s decision d0** is the personally best decision in the set 
N(1) that forestalls appeals at the first level of appeals, so that appeals never in fact occur.    
19 (b) The adjudicator’s decision d0** in N(1) is connected to the preferences and 
costs of appeals at all levels through the linking formulas (5).  In particular, N(1) must be 
contained in [dS* – (c1 + ... + cn), dS* + (c1 + ... + cn)].// 
The linking formulas relate the adjudicator’s decision to the preferences of the 
highest level appeals court (although the preferences of other appeals courts also play a 
role), and the influence of the highest court is explicit in the bound [dS* – (c1 + ... + cn), 
dS* + (c1 + ... + cn)] for N(1), which note, is independent of the preferences of the 
adjudicators below the top level of appeals.  This bound means that, the lower are the 
costs of making appeals, the closer must be the initial decision d0** to the socially 
optimal decision dS*.  Also, as in section 4.1, complete subsidy of appeals (here, at all 
levels) would lead adjudicators to make the socially optimal decision. 
  4.5 Uncertainty about the outcome of appeals.   It was assumed in the basic 
model that litigants and adjudicators know the decision dS* that the appeals court would 
make.   If, however, litigant and adjudicator knowledge of what appeals courts would 
decide is incomplete, then the threat of appeal will be imperfectly calibrated to true 
deviations from dS*, reducing the effectiveness of the appeals process in inducing better 
decisions.   
To examine this point, assume that there is a probability distribution of dS* and 
that litigants and adjudicators know this distribution but not dS* in a particular case.   
Since the expected return for litigant 1 from an appeal would be E(dS*), he would make 
an appeal when E(dS*) – c > d, and litigant 2 would make an appeal when E(dS*) + c < d, 
so that appeals would not be made when the decision d is in N = [E(dS*) – c, E(dS*) + c].   
20 As in the basic model, the adjudicator will select the best decision in N, so that 
appeals will not occur, but the logic behind this conclusion is slightly different from in 
the basic model.  If the adjudicator chooses d outside of N and provokes appeal, his 
expected utility will be Eu(dS*), but this is strictly less than u(E(dS*)) since u is strictly 
concave.  Hence, even if the reversal penalty is zero, the adjudicator is strictly better off 
choosing E(dS*), which is in N, than provoking appeal.  Thus, the adjudicator will choose 
the best d in N, meaning that if d* < E(dS*) – c, he will choose E(dS*) – c, that if d* is in 
N he will choose d*, and that if d* > E(dS*) + c, he will choose E(dS*) + c.  
Regarding social welfare, clearly, if the appeals process changes adjudicator 
behavior, it may or may not raise social welfare in a particular case, since the threat of 
appeal could result in a decision that is farther away from the socially desirable outcome 
than the unconstrained choice d* of the adjudicator would be.  It is also true that the 
appeals process might not raise social welfare in an expected sense; see the Appendix for 
an example.  Hence, it cannot be said that the appeals process is socially desirable in the 
presence of uncertainty about the appeals court decisions.  The problem is that 
adjudicator behavior is influenced not by the true decision that the appeals court would 
make but by an imperfect perception of it.  The conclusions are summarized in the 
following result. 
Proposition 8.  Assume that litigants and the adjudicator know only the 
probability distribution over the socially optimal outcome dS*  that would be reached by 
the appeals court.    
(a) The adjudicator’s decision d** is the personally best decision in the set N that 
forestalls appeals, so that appeals never in fact occur.   
21 (b) If the unconstrained best choice d* of the adjudicator would not result in an 
appeal, the adjudicator’s choice d** is d*.  Otherwise, the adjudicator chooses the  
closest end point of N  (d** is either E(dS*) – c or E(dS*) + c), a decision that barely 
forestalls appeals. 
(c) The appeals process may or may not raise actual or expected social welfare.//   
This proposition may be reinterpreted to apply where dS* is fixed and where there 
is a distribution of appeals court judges identified by their preferred decisions, say dA*, 
and where litigants and adjudicators know only the distribution of dA*.  Then the above 
proposition implies (let dA* play the role of dS*) that an adjudicator will choose the 
personally best decision in N = [E(dA*) – c, E(dA*) + c].  Hence, if appeals court judges 
are on average unbiased, that is, if E(dA*) = dS*, then N = [dS* – c, dS* + c], which is to 
say, adjudicators make decisions as if appeals courts have the social objective.  In other 
words, 
Corollary 9.  Assume that litigants and the adjudicator know only the probability 
distribution over the outcome dA*  that would be reached by an appeals court but that 
appeals courts are on average unbiased, E(dA*) = dS*.   Then the adjudicator makes the 
same decision he would if the appeals court has the social objective: the adjudicator 
chooses the personally best decision d** in N = [dS* – c, dS* + c].// 
Thus, for instance, if all judges, trial court adjudicators and appeals court judges, are 
drawn from the same distribution of judges and the average decision is socially correct, 
then adjudicators will be just as well controlled by the appeals process as they would be if 
all appeals court judges had exactly the social preference dS*.  Of course, this conclusion 
rests on the assumption that litigants and adjudicators cannot predict which appeals court 
22 judge they face; if they know who they would face, an adjudicator’s decision would be in 
N = [dA* – c, dA* + c], and so might be very different from what it is when N =[dS* – c, 
dS* + c]. 
4.6 Uncertainty about the making of appeals.  Whereas it was assumed in the 
basic model that adjudicators are able to predict perfectly when appeals would be made, 
adjudicators may be uncertain when appeals would be made because their knowledge 
about litigants may be imperfect.  This means that appeals may in fact occur, because an 
adjudicator may misgauge whether a litigant would bring an appeal. 
To investigate these issues, suppose that litigants differ in the non-negative cost c 
of making an appeal but that adjudicators know only the distribution of c.
20  Let f(c) be 
the probability density of c for each litigant, where f is continuous, f(0) = 0,  f(c) > 0 for c 
> 0, and where F(c) is the cumulative distribution function of c; assume too that each 
litigant’s c is the same.
21  If an adjudicator chooses d < dS*, there will be an appeal by 
litigant 1 if c < dS* – d; and if an adjudicator chooses d > dS*, there will be an appeal by 
litigant 2 if c < d – dS*.   Hence, the expected utility of an adjudicator as a function of d is  
      (1 – F(dS* – d))u(d) + F(dS* – d)(u(dS*) – r)                           for d < dS*,  
(8)  u(dS*)                            for d = dS*, 
(1 – F(d  –  dS*))u(d) + F(d  –  dS*)(u(dS*) – r)                for d > dS*. 
Let us show that if d* < dS*, then the adjudicator’s decision d** is such that d* < 
d** < dS*.   (If d* > dS*, an essentially identical argument shows that d* > d** > dS*.)   
                                                 
20 Alternatively, it could be assumed that adjudicator’s have imperfect knowledge of litigant utility 
functions or of their information about dS*.  
 
21 This might be a fit assumption if, for example, one side’s expenditures on appeal would need to 
be countered by the other.  In any case, the assumption is made for convenience and is inessential. 
 
23 Observe initially that d** cannot exceed dS*, for if d = dS*, (8) is just u(dS*), whereas if d 
> dS*, (8) is less than u(dS*) (since u(d) < u(dS*), because d* < dS* < d).  Likewise, d** 
cannot lie below d*, for (8) is higher at d* than at a lower d.
22  Hence, we can restrict 
attention to d in [d*, dS*].   For such d, (8) is 
(9)        (1 – F(dS* –  d))u(d) + F(dS* – d)(u(dS*) – r), 
the derivative with respect to d of which is  
(10)  f(dS* – d)[u(d) – (u(dS*) – r)] + (1 – F(dS* –  d))uN(d). 
Note that the first term is the marginal benefit to the adjudicator from raising d: the 
marginal reduction f(dS* –  d) in the likelihood of appeals multiplied by the utility benefit 
from avoiding appeal, u(d) – (u(dS*) – r).  The second term is the expected marginal 
utility cost.  At d*, the marginal cost is zero, as uN(d*) = 0 since d* is optimal, whereas 
the marginal benefit is positive, so that (9) rises as d is increased, implying that d** > d*.  
At dS*, (10) reduces to f(0)r + uN(dS*) = uN(dS*) < 0, so that d** < dS*.   The explanation 
is that at dS* there is a first-order utility gain from reducing d but no marginal loss from 
increasing the probability of an appeal. 
  Note that the point that there is always some effect of the appeals process on 
decisions is different from in the basic model, where if d* is in N, the appeals process has 
no influence on adjudicator behavior.  Here there is no N  known to the adjudicator, there 
is always a threat of appeal, so always a reason for him to alter the decision somewhat. 
                                                 
22 At d <  d*, the probability of appeal is higher than at d*.  Also u(d*) > u(dS*).  Hence, we have 
that (1 – F(dS* – d))u(d*) + F(dS* – d)(u(dS*) – r) < (1 – F(dS* –  d*))u(d*) + F(dS* – d*)(u(dS*) – r).  
Furthermore, since u(d) <  u(d*), we have (1 – F(dS* –  d))u(d) + F(dS* – d)(u(dS*) – r) < (1 – F(dS* – 
d))u(d*) + F(dS* – d)(u(dS*) – r).  Hence, (1 – F(dS* – d))u(d) + F(dS* – d)(u(dS*) – r) < (1 – F(dS* – 
d*))u(d*) + F(dS* – d*)(u(dS*) – r), which is that (8) is lower at d than at d*. 
 
24   Because the adjudicator chooses d** different from dS*, there will be a positive 
probability of appeals, and costs borne in the process, which is another difference from 
the basic model.  The expected costs of appeals are given by 
(11)    F(|dS* –  d**|)[2E(c|c < |dS* –  d**|)], 
since F(|dS* –  d**|) is the likelihood of appeal and E(c|c < |dS* –  d**|) are the mean 
costs of the litigant who brings an appeal.   
  Observe also that the higher is the penalty r for reversal, the closer will be the 
adjudicator’s decision to dS*.
23   This also contrasts with the basic model, where r did not 
influence the decision; since appeals actually occur and result in reversals, the penalty for 
them must matter to adjudicator behavior.  Also, raising r increases social welfare for two 
reasons.  First, raising r directly enhances social welfare because it makes d closer to dS* 
(it increases d in the case where d** < dS* and decreases d in the other case).  Second, 
raising r indirectly raises social welfare by making appeals less likely, and thus reduces 
the expected resource cost of appeals given by (11).  
  Because the appeals process results in the occurrence of costly appeals, the 
question arises whether the appeals process might be socially undesirable (it is obvious 
that it may be desirable, if the cost of appeals is sufficiently low).  The answer is that the 
appeals process may be undesirable, the reason being, in essence, that the decision of a 
litigant whether or not to bring an appeal involves a comparison of the private cost of an 
                                                 
23 The first order condition determining d is, from (10), f(dS*– d)[u(d) – (u(dS*) – r)] + (1 – F(dS* 
– d))uN(d) = 0. This is of the form z(d,  r) = 0 and implicitly determines d = d(r).  If z(d(r),  r) = 0 is 
differentiated with respect to r, we obtain that dN (r) = – zr/zd, but zd < 0 (the second-order condition for a 
maximum), and zr is f(dS* –  d) > 0, so that dN (r) > 0.  Note too that if the reversal penalty r were not a 
constant but an increasing function of the deviation |dS* –  d|, there would be an additional incentive for the 
adjudicator to choose a decision closer to dS*. 
 
 
25 appeal versus the private benefit, whereas the social comparison is different.
24  To 
demonstrate that the appeals process might be socially undesirable, observe that the 
behavior of litigants and adjudicators is determined by (8) and the probability distribution 
f over c.  This implies, among other things, that (8) and f determine the adjudicator’s 
decision d** and the expected costs of appeal, (11).   The nature of the social welfare 
function w(d) does not affect outcomes as long as w(d) is maximized at dS*.   Now 
consider a family of social welfare functions 8w(d) where 8 is a positive parameter.  
They are all maximized at the same decision, dS*, so that the behavior of litigants and 
adjudicators is the same regardless of 8w(d).  But as 8 becomes small, it must become 
socially undesirable to employ the appeals process because the welfare gain from the 
change in the adjudicator’s decision, 8[w(d**) – w(d*)], will be dominated by the cost of 
the process, F(|dS* –  d**|)[2E(c|c < |dS* –  d**|)], which does not depend on 8. 
  To summarize the various findings of this section, we state 
  Proposition 10.  Assume that adjudicators know only the probability distribution 
of the cost c of making an appeal among litigants, so do not know whether an appeal 
would be made. 
  (a) The adjudicator’s decision d** lies strictly between his unconstrained best 
choice d* and the socially optimal decision dS*, and the higher is the reversal penalty r, 
the closer is d** to dS*. 
(b) The probability of appeals is positive and the appeals process thus generates 
positive expected costs. 
                                                 
24 This point is an illustration of the more general point that the private incentives to use the legal 
system differ from the social ones; see generally Shavell (1997).  
26 (c) The appeals process may or may not be socially desirable (because its benefit 
in altering adjudicator decisions may or may not outweigh its expected costs).// 
4.7 Discretion of appeals courts whether to hear appeals.  To this point, it has 
been assumed that appeals courts consider any case that is appealed to them, whereas in 
fact appeals courts sometimes have discretion whether or not to hear an appeal.
25  Here 
discretion is investigated using the assumptions of the last section, where appeals are 
sometimes brought.  The possible value of discretion in this context is, as mentioned in 
the introduction, that the appeals court can refuse to hear cases for which the social 
benefit is outweighed by the cost.  This can help to counter the problem noted in the last 
section that, due to the cost of the appeals process, the appeals process might not be 
socially desirable.   
To be specific, assume that the appeals court can costlessly decide not to review a 
case that has been appealed, and that if the case is not heard, no costs will be borne by the 
litigants.
26  The appeals court will reject a case if and only if 
(12)  w(dS*) –  w(d) < 2c. 
For given that an appeal has been brought, social welfare will fall if the appeal is heard 
when (12) holds, since the left side is the change in social welfare from the decision if the 
appeal is heard and the right side is the cost to the two litigants of an appeal.
27   Hence, 
                                                 
25 This is often true at the second level of appeals, and notably at the Supreme Court of the United 
States.  
 
26 It would be straightforward to add the assumption that the appeals court must bear a cost to 
investigate an appeal and/or that the litigant must bear a cost for the case to be considered for appeal, and 
then an additional cost if it is heard.  These assumptions, while realistic, are not needed to develop the 
points of importance in this section. 
  
27 That the appeals court takes social costs of appeals into account here is consistent with its 
maximizing only w(d) in previous sections, since before it did not have the opportunity to decide whether 
or not to hear an appeal.  Note too that it is consistent with what has been assumed (see the remarks at the 
27 appeals will be brought and heard if and only if two conditions hold: that d is not in N = 
[dS* – c, dS* + c]; and that (12) does not apply, that is, that 
(13)  w(dS*) –  w(d) $ 2c 
is true.  Note that it may well be that (12) prevents appeals that would otherwise be 
brought, for it is quite possible that, for instance, d < dS* – c yet (12) holds.  (That is, it is 
quite possible that (w(dS*) –  w(d))/2  < c < dS* – d.
 28)    
To the degree that (12) prevents appeals from being brought, discretion must raise 
social welfare given the decision of the adjudicator.  However, because discretion may 
reduce the probability of appeal, it may lower the incentive of adjudicators to conform 
their decisions to dS* and so may indirectly reduce social welfare.  This raises the 
question whether discretion could be socially undesirable.  Examples (see the Appendix) 
show that discretion may lower social welfare as well as raise it.  (Note that it is not 
paradoxical that discretion might lower social welfare, for the appeals court decides 
whether to hear appeals on the basis of (12), which is to say, it maximizes social welfare 
only in an ex post sense.)  The main conclusion about discretion is  
  Proposition 11.  Under the assumptions of Proposition 10, suppose that the 
appeals court has discretion to decide whether or not to hear an appeal.  Then given any 
decision of the adjudicator, appeals court discretion can only lead to an increase in social 
welfare.  But because the adjudicator’s decision generally changes due to appeals court 
                                                                                                                                                 
end of section 2) that the appeals court maximizes social welfare in an ex post sense; the appeals court is 
assumed not to be able to commit to a policy of rejecting appeals. 
 
28 Not only is this possibility formally apparent, since no restrictions have been imposed on w 
other than that it is strictly concave, there are economic explanations for the possibility.  An important one 
is that social welfare may depend on damages d because of the incentives that payment of damages would 
create to prevent harm.  These incentives might be weak (for example, there might be little that can be done 
to prevent harm), implying that w would not be very sensitive to d.  In such a case, the effect of d on w 
might be less than the change in d, which is what the litigants care about.   
28 discretion, social welfare may or may not increase as a consequence of appeals court 
discretion.// 
5. Concluding Remarks 
(a) The main point elaborated in this article – that the threat of appeal leads 
adjudicators to make decisions that conform more closely to the socially optimal decision 
than would otherwise be the case – rests on the assumption that the appeals court would 
tend to right incorrect decisions, in other words, that the appeals court embodies the 
social interest.  Yet this is a fiction in a strict sense, since appeals courts must in fact be 
comprised of individuals who, like the lower court adjudicators of the model studied 
here, may have their own preferences.  Hence, the problem of policing adjudicator 
behavior is recapitulated at the appeals court level.  (Indeed, if the appeals court judge 
has the same preferences as the trial court judge, the appeals process is valueless.
29)   
This problem of who guards the guardians is ameliorated in a number of ways 
going outside the analysis of this article.  In particular, society may invest special effort 
in selecting appeals court judges to ensure that their preferences are aligned with 
society’s, it may have appeals court judges decide in panels (so as to offset each others’ 
differences in preferences), and it may induce appeals court judges to write opinions 
explaining their decisions (reducing their ability to contravene social preferences).  The 
problem that appeals court judges have their own preferences is also reduced in two ways 
studied in the analysis.  First, as noted in Corollary 9, if appeals court judges’ preferences 
are socially desirable on average and trial court judges do not know which appeals court 
                                                 
29 If the appeals court adjudicator has the same utility function u(d) as the trial court adjudicator, 
the latter would choose his personally optimal decision d* and no appeals would be made, for they would 
not be reversed – thus the outcome would be the same as in the absence of an appeals process. 
   
29 judge they will draw in a case, then the appeals process will function well.  Second, as 
shown in section 4.4, if there are tiers of appeals with the adjudicator at the topmost level 
having the social interest, the social decisional preferences will be transmitted (to a 
degree reflecting appeals costs at all levels, among other factors) down to the level of the 
trial court; thus by appropriate selection of adjudicators only at the highest levels of 
appeal, society has at its disposal a relatively cheap way of helping to ensure that 
decisionmaking at the level of trial courts is guided by its preferences. 
(b) At the outset of this article, it was suggested that the appeals process might be 
viewed in a general light, as a means of reducing an agent’s deviation from optimal 
behavior in a principal and agent setting.  To amplify, the reason that an agent’s behavior 
differs from what would be mutually best for him and the principal involves, of course, 
the principal’s lack of information, either about the agent’s information set or about his 
action.
30  Implicit in the assumption that the principal lacks information is that the cost of 
obtaining the information about the agent is too high to make that worthwhile.  In some 
circumstances, however, an analogue to the appeals process could operate to cheaply 
reduce the agency problem.  This might be so when three conditions hold: there is a 
person who is in a natural position to know the agent’s information set or to observe his 
action; this third person could credibly report his observation to the principal; and the 
third person would have a motive to do so, notably if he would suffer from the agent’s 
deviations.
31  The threat of such a third person making a report to the principal could 
                                                 
30 See, for example, the articles collected in Pratt and Zeckhauser (1991). 
  
31 For example, an employee (the third person) working under a manager (the agent) might 
observe the manager shirking (for instance, showing up late), might be able to convey this information 
credibly to a higher level party in the firm (representing the principal), and might suffer due to the shirking 
(have to work harder while the manager is absent).  However, it is evident that one of the three conditions 
often would not hold.  Relevant information about the agent might not be known by a third person (for 
30 make the agent behave better, and to the degree that the agent acted so as to forestall a 
report, this appeals-like process would not involve cost.  Explicit investigation of when 
these conditions might hold (or could be engendered) in a principal and agent framework 
might be worthwhile.
32
                                                                                                                                                 
instance, there might be no one who is privy to the manager’s information set, such as his menu of business 
opportunities); or if relevant information is known by a third person, it might not be easy to credibly 
convey (it might be difficult to establish that the manager often showed up late, or what the manager’s 
business opportunities were); or the third person might not have a motive to make a report (a manager 
might find a way to punish the third person for having made a report). 
 
32 Among the issues of interest in such an investigation is that of possible collusion between the 
agent and a third person for him not to make a report to the principal (but how would an agreement 
between them be enforced?).  An article that deals with these issues in the specific context of the 
government procurement process is Marshall, Meurer, and Richard (1994), in which procurement officers 
are viewed as agents of the government, the principal, and firms that do not obtain contracts may protest to 
a government board of contract appeals.   
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Proposition 8.  The only point that needs to be addressed is why the appeals 
process might lower expected social welfare, which we show by providing an example.  
Suppose that there are two equally likely social welfare functions: w1(d) = –(d – 1)
2 and 
w2(d) = –,(d – 2)
2, where , will be chosen to be small.  Observe that if the social welfare 
function is w1(d), then the socially best decision dS* is 1, and if the social welfare 
function is w2(d), then dS*  is 2.  Consequently, E(dS*) = 1.5.  Let c = .01.  Also, assume 
that u(d) = –(d – 1)
2, so that the unconstrained choice of the adjudicator d* would be 1.  
We know from section 4.5 that, given the appeals process, the adjudicator would choose 
d** = E(dS*) – c = 1.5 – .01 = 1.49, since this exceeds d* = 1.  Expected social welfare is 
therefore –[.5(1.49 – 1)
2 + .5,(1.49 – 2)
2] = –[.12 + .13,].  However, if there were no 
appeals process, the adjudicator would choose d* = 1, and expected social welfare would 
be –[.5(0) + .5,] = –.5,.  Clearly, if , is sufficiently small, –.5, > –[.12 + .13,], so that 
expected social welfare is higher in the absence of the appeals process.  
 
Proposition 11.  Two examples need to be supplied, one where discretion raises 
social welfare and one where it lowers social welfare.  These examples involve discrete 
distributions over c; it will be obvious that continuous approximations of them could be 
constructed in which discretion has the same effect on social welfare. 
Example where discretion raises social welfare.  Let the adjudicator’s utility be –
(d – 2)
2, so that his unconstrained preferred decision d* is 2, and let social welfare be  
34 –.001(d – 10)
2, so that the socially preferred decision of the appeals court is 10.  Let r = 0 
and let there be two possible costs of making and defending an appeal: c1 = 1, with 
probability .1; c2 = 2, with probability .9.  
  No appeals court discretion:  The adjudicator will obviously not want to choose d 
> 10, so we can consider d # 10.   Observe that a c1  will appeal such a decision if and 
only if d < 9 and that a c2 will appeal such a d if and only if d < 8.  Hence, the 
adjudicator will in fact choose either 8 or 9: if d < 8, there will definitely be an appeal, so 
d will equal 10, making the adjudicator worse off than if d = 8; the adjudicator would not 
choose d in (8, 9), for choosing 8 dominates any such d because litigant behavior is the 
same and the adjudicator prefers 8 to a higher d; likewise he would not choose a d in (9, 
10].   It is readily verified that the adjudicator would choose 8 instead of 9: at d = 8, c1s 
would appeal but not c2s, so the adjudicator’s expected utility would be –[.1(10 – 2)
2 + 
.9(8 – 2)
2] = –38.8; at d = 9, no one would appeal, so the adjudicator’s utility would be –
(9 – 2)
2  = –49.   Thus, the adjudicator chooses d = 8 and appeals are made with 
probability .1 by c1s.  Social welfare is –[.1(2) + .9(.001)(10 – 8)
2] = – .2036, since when 
appeals are made social welfare from the decision is 0 but litigation costs of 2 are 
incurred, and since when appeals are not made d is 8. 
  Appeals courts have discretion:  In this case, any appeal would be rejected, since 
the maximum possible social value of an appeal is .001(10 – 2)
2 = .064 and the minimum 
cost is 2.  Since there can be no threat of appeal, the adjudicator will choose d = 2, there 
will be no appeals, and social welfare will be –.001(10 – 2)
2 = –.064. 
Effect of discretion:  Giving appeals courts discretion raises social welfare, from – 
.2036 to –.064.  The reason is that it results in the rejection of appeals whose social costs 
35 outweigh social benefits.  The resulting saving in social costs of appeals outweighs the 
undesirable effect that discretion has on the adjudicator incentives, which here is to 
reduce the decision d from 8 to 2. 
  Example where discretion lowers social welfare.  Let the adjudicator’s utility 
again be –(d – 2)
2, so that his unconstrained preferred decision d* is 2, and let social 
welfare be –(d – 10)
2/3, so that the socially preferred decision of the appeals court is 10.  
Let r = 0 and let there be three possible costs of making and defending an appeal: c1 = 1, 
with probability .1; c2 = 2, with probability .5; and c3 = 3 with probability .4.  
  No appeals court discretion:  The adjudicator will not want to choose d > 10, so 
we can consider d # 10.   A c1  will appeal such a decision if and only if d < 9, a c2 will 
appeal such a d if and only if d < 8, and a c3 will appeal such a d if and only if d < 7.  
Hence, the adjudicator will in fact choose either 7, 8, or 9: if d < 7, there will definitely 
be an appeal, so d will equal 10, making the adjudicator worse off than if d = 7, since 
then c3s will not appeal, making the adjudicator better off; the adjudicator would not 
choose d in (7, 8), for choosing 7 dominates any such d because litigant behavior is the 
same and the adjudicator prefers 7 to a higher d; likewise he would not choose a d in 
(8,9) or in (9, 10].   It is readily verified that among 7, 8, and 9, the adjudicator would 
choose 8: at d = 7, c2s and c1s would appeal but not c3s, so the adjudicator’s expected 
utility would be –[.6(10 – 2)
2 + .4(7 – 2)
2] = –48.4; at d = 8, c1s would appeal but not c2s 
and c3s, so the adjudicator’s expected utility would be –[.1(10 – 2)
2 + .9(8 – 2)
2] = –38.8; 
at d = 9, no one would appeal, so the adjudicator’s utility would be –(9 – 2)
2  = –49.   
Thus, what happens is that the adjudicator chooses d = 8 and appeals are made with 
probability .1 by c1s.  Social welfare is –[.1(2) + .9(10 – 8)
2/3] = –1.4, since when appeals 
36 are made social welfare from the decision is 0 but litigation costs of 2 are incurred, and 
since when appeals are not made d is 8. 
  Appeals courts have discretion:  In this case, again, the adjudicator will not 
choose d > 10, and will, by essentially the argument given above, not choose d in (7,8), 
(8, 9), or (9, 10].   If the adjudicator chooses d = 9, as before, no one would appeal, so the 
issue of discretion is moot, and the adjudicator’s utility would be –49.   If the adjudicator 
chooses d = 8, whereas before c1s would appeal, these appeals would be rejected by the 
appeals court, since the social value of such an appeal would be (10 – 8)
2/3 = 4/3, 
whereas the social cost of the appeal (for both parties) is 2.  Hence, the utility of the 
adjudicator would simply be –(8 – 2)
2 = –36.  If the adjudicator chooses d = 7, the c1s 
would wish to appeal and their appeal would be accepted, since its social value would be 
– (10 – 7)
2/3 = 3, whereas its social cost is 2.  However, although the c2s would also want 
to make an appeal, their appeal would be rejected, since its social cost is 4 > 3.   Hence, 
the adjudicator’s expected utility would be –[.1(10 – 2)
2 + .9(7 – 2)
2] =  –28.9.  Thus d = 
7 is superior to 8.  In fact, the adjudicator would choose d = 6.54, for he can reduce d to 
this level without provoking an appeal by the c2s that would be accepted by the appeals 
court: at d = 6.54, the social value of an appeal is 4, just equal to the social cost.  At this 
d, only the c1s would appeal, their appeals would be accepted, and the expected utility of 
the adjudicator would be –[.1(10 – 2)
2 + .9(6.54 – 2)
2] = –24.95.  (The adjudicator could 
reduce d to as low as 5.76 without provoking an appeal by the c3s that would be accepted 
by the appeals court: at d = 5.76, the social value of an appeal is 6, equal to the social 
cost.  At this d, the c1s and c2s would appeal, their appeals would be accepted, and the 
expected utility of the adjudicator would be –[.6(10 – 2)
2 + .4(5.76 – 2)
2] = –44.06 <  
37 –24.95.) 
  Effect of discretion: It has been seen that granting appeals courts discretion leads 
to a lower level of social welfare, –24.95 as opposed to –1.4.   The explanation is as 
indicated in section 4.7.   Appeals courts with discretion do not accept appeals when d = 
8 and the cost is 4, since the social benefit from such appeals is less than the cost, raising 
social welfare in itself.  But the consequence of this behavior, and of discretion in regard 
to other appeals, is to dilute the adjudicator’s incentive to conform his decision to the 
socially optimal one of 10, and he in fact lowers his decision from 8, in the absence of 
discretion, to 6.54.  This change in his behavior leads to the reduction in social welfare. 
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